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IN THE

SUPREME ·cOURT
OF THE

State of Uttf'ti

LED

JAN2 8 1952
MELVIN WOOD, LAVORA S.
-------------------------·-··---~
WOOD, LOY WOOD, ALVIN WOOD, , \4Qk, Supr.,.. Court:, Uhah
MINNIE ROSE WOOD, HAROLD
..
C.WEATHERSON,ATHELENE
WEATHERSON, CHARLES WOOD
and LEONA M. WOOD,
No. 7667
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
BRIANT E. ASHBY, ISABELL d ..
ASHBY, LEROY CHRISTENSEN
and WILMA C. CHRISTEN~E~,- _
Defendants and Appellants.

R.ES p 0 N D E-N T s BR I EF
I

--Ralph J. Lowe,
Attorney for

Respond~nts
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STATEMENT OF POIN'f~

POINT I-The court d~d not err in its construction
of the Traugott deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit~
in that the court placed an unwarranted and
unreasonable construction upon said. deed byJ·
limiting the right of access to the one rod
strip of land to a point near the center of
the Ashby property, and excluding the appeaJ
ing Defen~ants from access to and from cro~
ing said border strip in any other manner
whatsoever.
1

1

,

I

!

POINT II- The court did not err in finding that ~
D~fendants Christensen have no right of war
across or right of access to the premises
covered by the Traugott deed of 1907. c~

POINT III-The court did not err in entering the
following findings: No. 8 on page 2 of its
findings; No. 11 on page 3; No. 1 on page
4; No. 2 on page 4, 5, and 6; No. 5 on page
7; No. 1 on page 8; No. 6 on page 10; No. 7 a
on page 10; because said findings are not ! &
supported by the evidence.
.~~ ~

A

~

POINT IV-The court did not err in entering the
•
following conclusions of law: No. 1 on pag •
10 and 11 of the findings and conclusions; ~
No. 2 page 11; No. 5 page 11.
N~

1e!

de:

POINT V-The court did not err in directing the
fendants to remove any and all items which
may polute the water supply to a reasonable
distance from the said water supply withe~
finding which items, if any, existing upon
any of the property will or may pollute the
water su_pply.
POINT VI-The court did not err in failing to restrain Plaintiffs from building a fence or

other obstruction along or upon the one ro
strip of land.
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
~IEL VIN

WOOD, LAVORA S.
vVOOD, LOY WOOD, ALVIN WOOD,
~IINNIE ROSE WOOD, HAROLD
C.WEATHERSON,ATHELENE
WEATHERSON, CHARLES WOOD
and LEONA M. WOOD,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

No. 7667

vs.
BRIANT E. ASHBY, ISABELL C.
ASHBY, LEROY CHRISTENSEN
and WILMA C. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS AND THE ISSUE

The Brief of the defendant and appellant states the
facts of the case adequately with the further explanation
that Mikesell was not made a party to the action as
1
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Mikesell's property had been purchased by one of the
respondents. As to the taxes as mentioned on page
five of plaintiffs' brief, it was stipulated by the parties
in open court that the taxes hed been paid by the respondents since 1907 on the strip of property in questhe property from the year 1933 until the present tiine.
The taxes on this property had been paid double since
1933. (Tr. 7).
The principal issue as presented by the appellants
'' si1nmers down to the respective rights of the plaintiffs
and the appealing defendants in the narrow strip of land
about a rod wide extending along the Southern boundary
of the land owned by the appealing defendants Ashby
and Christensen." The nature and effect of the Court's
Findings, Conclusions and Decree as presented by the
appellant on pages 6 and 7 of appellants' brief are somewhat in error in that that portion of the property lying
within the public highway was specifically excluded in
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on page four
paragraph one.
The appellants state that the court found further
that the defendant Christens ens ''have no right, title or
interest and no right to use the property claimed by the
plaintiffs as a highway or for a right of way in connection with the use of the property claimed.'' We find in
the Decree that ''It is further ordered, adjusted and
decreed that the said defendants have no estate, right,
title or interest whatever in to said land and premises
except as stated in said deed and that the title of plaintiffs is good and valid.'' (Page 2 of Decree). This
gives the defendants the right to the right of way for
road purposes across the property at a point approxi2
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1nately one-half the distance between the East and West
points \\·here the gate exists in the said fence. The appellants further state on page 7 of their brief that there
are no findings or conclusions as to what may pollute or
\rhat has polluted the "\Vater. On page 3 of the Findings
of :B., act, the court found ''that the defendants Briant E .
. .-\.~hby and Isabell C. Ashby have within the year before
the filing· of this action either moved upon said property
or pernri.tted the 1noving thereon of pigpens •:t: * * and
that one said pigpen has been placed immediately adjacent to the well house which said pigpen was completely or nearly co1npletely upon the above described property."
Further, the appellants say that the Decree in effect
deprives those who purchase land to the North and East
of Christensens from using the road which they have
heretofore used in getting access to the public road to the
South and prevents the crossing of the strip of land in
question at all except at a point approximately one-half
way between the well and East end of the strip decribed
in the old Traugott deed. That this means that the
Christensens and those East and North find themselves
completely landlocked. This is not true in that parties
North could use the right of way at the half-way mark.
Christensens' property is very near to the East end of the
respondents' property. Christensens' home is at least
forty-three feet back from the road and is well back frorn
the Wood property.
POINT I
The Respondents contend that the findings and deeree which lilnit the right of way over the Wood property
to the location ''at a point approximately one-half of the

3
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distance between the East and West points where the
gate exists in the said fence" is proper and is supported
by the evidence. Appellants contend that they are entitled to use respondents' land as they see fit going East
and West on the land as well as 1naking 1nany roadways
from North and South. Point one upon which the appellants request a reversal of judgment is concerned with
the construction of a deed. We quote fro1n the Traugott
deed:
''Reserving, however, to said grantors a right
of way for road purposes across the above-described
premises." (italics ours).
The location of that crossing is shown by the only gate
in the South fence which was approximately one-half way
bet-vveen the East and West points and from that gate
across the land was the only evident roadway, there being
no evidence of a road or travel East and West on the said
property. Respondent had never objected to the use of
this right of way across the property. We quote the following law, to-wit:
"It is said in Ritchey v. Welsh, 149 Ind. 214, 48
N.E. 1031, that: 'When the way is once selected it
cannot be changed by either party without the consent
of the other' : Citing Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102,
5 Am. Dec. 302; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507, 510;
Morris vs. Edgington, 3 Taunt, 24; Goddard's l~aw of
Easements, Bennett's Ed., 351. See, also, 2 Washburn on Real Property, 4th ed., 306; Washburn on
Easements and Servitudes, 4th ed., 258, 263.
'Where the right to an easement is granted without giving definite location and description to it, the
4
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exercise of the easeutent in a particular course or
utanner, \Yi th the consent of both parties, renders it
fixed and eertain, and the dominant owner has no
right after\\Tard. to u1ake ehanges affecting its location, extent, or eharacter': 10 Ant. & Eng. Ency. of
La\Y, :Zd Ed., 430 and cases cited in note 3" 95 A1n.
St. Rep.~ Page 317.
· ·1. Change of Location.-When a private
right of \\Tay has been once selected and located, its
location cannot be changed by either party; neither
the owner of the land nor the owner of the easement,
"Without the consent of the other party: Ritchey v.
\\relsh, 1±9 lnd. 21±, ±8 N.E. 1031; Manning v. Port
Reading R.R. Co., 54 N.J. Eq. ±6 33 Atl. 802; Galloway v. \Vilder, 26 ~fich. 96. If a right of way is
granted \vithout any designation of the place, it
beco1nes located by usage for a length of time, and,
after being so located, it cannot afterward be changed
by the grantor without the consent of the grantee:
vVynkoop v. Binger, 12 Johns. 222. The location of
a private way detern1inted by agreement, usage, or
acquiescence cannot be changed by one party without
the consent of the other: Kurmuller v. ·Krotz, 18
Iowa, 353. The grantee of a right of way has no right
to change its location as often as he may think necessary or at will: Moorhead v. Snyder, 31 Pa. St.
514. 95 Am. St. Rep. 323.

Appellants have claimed that Christensens have
used a road extending from their house to the highway.
The Christensens did not buy their land nor build their
house until after appellant Briant E. Ashby bought the
property· in 1947. There 1s no evidence that the pre5
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decessors in interest to Ashby ever clairned any right
of way except through the one gate. The testimony of
the witness Joyce Harrop, who was one of the O\Vners
frorn whorn the appellants purchased, testified that he
had traveled East and West to the orchard,. Upon being
asked where he traveled, he pointed on the plat to an
area North of the pipeline and the property owned by
Woods. (Tr. 151). The intention of Traugott in his
conveyance to Wood to give a fee sin1ple to the property
with the reservation of the right of way was evidenced
by the testin1ony of David Warren who had lived in
Clearfield for sixty-nine years and who had worked for
Traugott and who had been informed_by Traugott that
he was to cultivate the Traugott land to the pipeline but
not to go South of there because the land to the South
belonged to Jim Wood. (Tr. 133). ~1r. Warren is a
disinterested party and his testimony indicate_s that the
intention was to give no more easement to the property
but an absolute ownership to James G. Wood.
Appellants cite case after case to the effect that
''the subsequent owner of a part of such tenement has
the right to use the way as appurtenant. to his particular
part of the land. They contend that purchasers from
Ashby have the benefit of the reservation for road purposes. This is correct, but it is a right to use for road
purposes that particular roadway or right of way
through the gate and across the property. The reservation cannot be extended by giving as many rights of way
as Ashby and his successors may desire.
''Thus where a deed conveys an easement over
certain land but fails to locate exactly the line over
which the easement extends, parol evidence has been

6
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held adinissable so to locate it. The general rule is
that the location of an ease1nent once selected cannot
be changed by either the land ovvner or the ease1nent
O\Yner 'vithout the other's consent. The reason for
this rule i8 that treating the location as variable,
would incite litigation and depreciate the value and
discourage the iinproven1ent of the land upon which
the ease1nent is charged. Accordingly, a definite
location of an ease1nent determines and limits the
right of the grantee so that' he cannot again exercise
a choice * * * Although the owner of an easement,
such as a right of way, may do whatever is reasonably necessary to make it suitable and convenient
for his use, he is not entitled to deviate therefrom.''
17 Am. Juris. 988-9.
As a general rule, the location of a way of necessity may be determined by an agreement which need
not be in writing, but may be inferred from words
or conduct, for example, where parties build a line
fence up to the side of a road, but do not build across
the road, setting a bar o'r gatepost on the side thereof,
they will be held to have agreed upon such road as
the location of a way of necessity.'' 17 Am. Juris.
991-2.
In the Wood case we have not only a gatepost but a
gate. The location has been fixed.
"There is _a rule, however, to the effect that the
court should not change the location of a way after
such has been fixed. * * * As already stated, with
respect to easements in general, it is well settled that
when the location of a way of necessity is once de7
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fined, both parties are bound by the lines so fixed;
the owner of the dominant estate is not entitled to
use any other way. The situation is the same as if
there had been an express grant of the particular
way. * * * Moreover, after. the location of such a way
has been fixed, a court will not change it. * * * "
1 7Am. Juris. 991, Sections 94 & 95.
In Hewitt vs. Parry, 34 N.E. (2) 489 cited by the appellants, we are concerned only with one easement and
no others.
In Sakansky et al. vs. Vein et al., N.H. 169 Atl., 1 also
cited by the appellants as the law, allow us to read
further in this case and on page three the court says:
''The rule merely refuses to give unreasonable
rights or to impose unreasonably burdens, when the
parties, either actually or by legal implication, have
spoken generally.''
Paragraph 6 on Page 3 reads as .follows:
''In the case at bar the parties are bound by a
contract which not only gave the dominant owner
a way across the servient estate for the purpose of
access to the rear of its premises, but also gave that
way definite location upon the ground. The use
which the plaintiff may make of the way is limited
by the bounds of reason, but within those bounds it
has the unlimited right to travel over the land set
apart for a way. It has no right to insist upon the
use of any other land of the defendants for a way,
regardless of how necessary such other land may be
to it and regardless; of how little change or inconvenience such use of the defendant's land might oc-

8
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casiou to thern. · · (italics unrs).
The above case \Va~ one where a deed gave a definite right of \Yay 18 feet \\Tide over son1e land in 1849.
The co~e ,,·as decided in 1933. The land owner desired
to build an arch and then
··Lay out a new way over level ground around

the \vesterly end of the new building * * * to the same
point on the do1ninant estate as the old way.''
The 1naster pernlitted both changes. The Supreme' Court
states that the road could not be changed.
\V e quote fron1 American Brass Company vs.

S~rra,

132 Atl. 656 which is also cited by the appellants.
·'The cornpany in so doing used, without objection or hindrance, a passageway five or six feet wide
over the servient tract. Since that time ( 1888-89)
(these figures are not in the quote) this way has
been clearly visible as evidenced by a vvell-defined
course of wheel tracks * * * and by bars across the
tracks at the entrance into the highway. As the
grant of the passway did not fix the route, its location vvas apparently deter1nined and thus established,
in accord with the reasonable convenience of the
dominant and servient owner, by practical location
and use by the grantee, acquiesced in by the grantor
at the time."
Adan1s vs. Hodgkins 85 Atl., 530, is cited by the ap1Wllants. This case deals only with the question of ways
llPressity and abandonrnent. There is no similarity to
to the case at bar. Peck vs. Mackowsky 82 Atl. 199 is
rited hy the appellants to show that th~ reservation for
9
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right of way annexed to two parcels of ground. ~Iay it
be pointed out, however; that the court held in that case
that the two parcels of ground had a right to use the one
passageway. In Bowers, et al. vs. Myers, et al., 85 Atl.,
860, no reference is made to additional right of ways.
Methodist Protestant Church vs. Laws 7 Ohio CC 21,
4 Ohio GS 562 cited by appellants merely points out that
the tenants of a donrinant estate may use the right of way
however 1nany the tenants may be. I call your attention
to the bottom of page 13 of plaintiffs' brief in quoting
the above which among other things states:
"Provided the right can be enjoyed as to the
separate parcels without any additional charge or
burden to the proprietor or the servient tenement.''
We find no case, however, giving separate easements.
It might be added that
''In construing any grant of a right of way the
use in connection and extent is limited to ·such as is
reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome as to the servient
estate as possible for the use contemplated.'' l\1orris vs. Blunt 161 P. 1127.
Also see Nielsen vs. Sandberg, 141 P. (2) 696 which holds
that:
''An easement being a burden on the land which
it traverses is limited to use by which it was acquired and to the person who acquired it or for the
benefit of the property for which it was acquired."
A Utah case in point says:
''The extent of an easement is deter1nined by the

10
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grant and once the character has been fixed no Inaterial change or enlarge1nent of the right acquired can
be n1ade if thereby a greater burden is placed on the
8erYient estate.'' Big Cottonwood Taylor Ditch Co.
v~. Doyle 159 P. (2) 596 as modified 174 P. (2) ·148 .
.. :B-,ailure to definitely locate and describe an easelnent does not give grantee right to use servient estate
without lin1itation.'' Cullison vs. Hotel Seaside, 268
Pac. 7:-JS. In this san1e case "over grantor's land" was
held to 1nean in a convenient, direct way.
~Iinto

vs. Salem Water Light & Power Company, 250
P. 722; an Oregon case, held that the extent of the easement depended upon the proper construction of a grant
\vithout consideration of extraneous circumstances where
the language was unan1biguous.
As to how the deed should be construed, Eastman vs.
Church :219 S.\\r. (2) 406, a Kentucky case, holds that if
an a1nbiguity or awkard provision in a deed including
reservation or exception is capable of two .possible constructions one of which will be more favorable to grantee
and the other to grantor all doubts are reserved in favor
of grantee and the deed so construed. May we point out
that Woods predecessors in interest were the grantees in
the Traugott deed.
Appellant states that the court's decision limits the
right of way so as to be beneficial to only one narrow
tract. This is not true. All the appellants need to do
is use a portion of his own land as a roadway down to
the right of way provided in the Decree of the court and
as provided by the Traugott deed. It is apparent however, that the appellants prefer to travel over respond11
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ents property destroying the use of that land rather than
to apportion a small portion of their own land for a roadway. As evidence that consideration was given to using
their own land for roadvvay we find that shortly after this
property was purchased by the appellants he had contacted a Mr. Smith and a Mr. Allred and arranged for a
building plan and arranged for a street to go through the
center part of the land owned by the Ashbys lying North
of the pipeline. See testin1ony of Mr. Briant Ashby.
( Tr. 122). May I quote from his testimony:

"Q. At one time, Mr. Ashby, you v.rere attenlpting and you did arrange for a building plan, and you
did arrange for a street to go along through the center part of the land lying North of the pipeline didn't
you1
A.

Yes sir.

Q. I take it you went so far as to employ Allred
to build that building.
A.

Yes sir.

Q. At that time you had a road running in an
irregular line running down through the property at
the center.

new

A.

I had about three different plans.

Q.

And you had a building facing this proposed

street~

A.

Yes sir.

Q. And you had those building lots extended as
far South and only as far South to the pipe line
didn't· you~

12
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A. Yes sir.
Sn1ith and ~ir. Allred that
you \Yere only to extend the lots to the pipeline didn't
you1

Q. ..:\.nd you told

~lr.

~\..

Providing there was an agreement made on
that street and on that right of way." (Tr. 123).
Calling your attention to plaintiffs' Exhibit "F". As
sho'ru by the exhibit, the appellants had access to high'Nay 91 as their property adjoined the said highway on
the West. The proposed roadway through appellants
property w. ould have given them ingress and egress to
highway 91. Since that time, however, apparently appellant has sold all but approximately three acres. ( Tr. 115)
including that property abutting on highway 91 and is
now asking for a separate right of way for each lot which
he has sold or might sell. It has been his own doing if
he has cut himself off from access to highway 91. He and
the others \vho have purchased or may purchase from him
do have a right of access to the road on the South over
the designated right of way. The appellants were all inforined of the Woods claim to the property as shown by
the testimony of Briant Ashby (Tr. 125 & 126) and
LeRoy Christensen as shown by his testimony on Tr. 103
and 104 in which he testified that Loy Wood and Melvin
Wood had told him they owned property in front of his
proposed building spot. He was so informed at the time
he contemplated building. The fact that the Woods owned
the property was of public record. At the time Briant
Ashby contemplated the purchase of the property the evidence indicates that he was informed by Joyce Harrop
(Tr. 142 & 150) of the Wood's property. This was sup-

13
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ported by the testi1nony of Howard Woods ('rr. 29 and
30). Briant Ashby was informed by Woods of their clailn
shortly after his purchase. ( Tr. 125 & 126).
The predecessors in interest to Ashbys never made
any claim of right to the property nor to a right of way
other than that indicated by the gate in the fence which
was a right of way across the property. Witness the
testimony of Joyce Harrop. Mr. Harrop testified that he
moved grapevines and peach trees at the request of the
Woods. (Tr.138-139). He also testified that he 1nade no
claim to the strip of land at the time he owned the Ashby
property. (Tr. 140). This Inan knew what he was
selling to the Ashbys. The deed which he signed did not
contain that property which he intended to sell to Ashby.
He had pointed out that which he intended to sell to Ashbys but the deed was prepared by the bank and this witness signed the same, probably unaware of what the
deed conveyed.
Alvin Wood testified that he used to visit the Wood
property weekly or more often during a certain period
of time to check on it and clean it up .. (Tr. 156). Melvin Wood testified that he had worked on the property
with his father (Tr. 78) who was predecessor in interest
to the current owners. He testified that the right
of way at the .gate was the only one used. (Tr. 86).
Loy Wood testified that his father cultivated the land
( Tr. 48 and 49) and that Clark, another predecessor in
interest, asked permission to cultivate on occasion. (Tr.
50). That they stopped "Brother Clark" from farn1ing
it when tomatoes were being watered in such a manner
as to seep through into the well. He also testified that
he helped build the first fence (Tr. 52) and that the
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second fence "?as built by Harrop::; after obtaining perInission.
Does this testiinony and this evidence indicate anything other than a pleasant relationship between the
do1ninant and serYient o'vners with no claiu1 by the
don1inant o"~ners to anything other than the evident
right of 'vay.

POINT II
.A. 1nore careful exainination of the findings of the
Court sho,vs that contrary to defendant's statement that
the court found ·'that the defendants Christensen have no
right of way across or right of access to the premises
covered by the Traugott deed of 1907 the findings of the
court were in fact that the Christensens had no right to
use the property as a highway and for a right of way in
connection with the use of the following described real
estate owned by these answering defendants" (A use
they had asserted in their counterclaim.) The described
real estate describes the property of the defendants
Christensen along with the property owned by the plaintiffs immediately South of Christensen's property. Thus
the court deprives the defendant Christensens of a right
of way ac.ross the property directly South of Christensen's own property but Christensen is not deprived of a
right of way at a point where the old gate is and these
defendants and any who may purchase from the defendants would have a right to use that particular right of
way.
•

POINT III
As to point three· of appellants' brief it is submitted
that these findings which are objected to were supported
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by the testiu1ony of Melvin Wood. ( Tr. 78) David Warren, ( Tr. 133) Joyce Harrop, ( Tr. 138, 139 and 140) Alvin Wood, ('rr. 156) Howard Hale, Lottie J. Clark, (Tr.
· 38 & 40) Loy Wood, (Tr. 38 & 39 and Tr. 50, Tr. 52)
David S. Warren, ( Tr. 133). The testin1ony of those
named above other than the Woods and Warren was to
the effect that they made no claim on the property. They
were all the predecessors in interest to the Ashbys. The
wood testimony all substantiated the fact that they
claimed the property as their own since the purchase by
their father, who was their predecessor in interest. The
testimony of Mr. Warren showed that after the time of
the conveyance from Traugott to Wood that Traugott
made no claim
the property. As a counterclaim these
two defendants plead that they were in the open, notorious, adverse, hostile, uninterrupted, continuous, exclusive, unmolested and undisputed possession of the said
property, including this property lying South of the pipeline. The dependants, LeRoy Christensen and his wife,
Wilma C. Christensen, filed a separate answer based
upon the same defense as Briant E. Ashby and Isabell C.
Ashby clai1ned and in addition plead that they had built
a house on the property in question, but the testi1nony of
Mr. Christensen showed that his house was well North of
. the pipeline.

to

May we call the court's attention to Title 104, Article
2 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943. We quote 104-2-5,
as amended, the amendment not referring to actions of
this kind.
''Seisin or possession within Seven Years Necessary. No action for the recovery of r.eal property or
for the possession thereof shall be Inaintained, unless
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it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or
predecessor \Yas seised or possessed of the property
in question \\rithin seven years before the conunenceInent of the action.''
Like,vise, 10-1-2-6 states that no defense or counterclaim
shall be effectual unless it appears that the person interposing the defense or counterclaim or the predecessor
or grantor \vas seized or possessed of the property in
question \vithin seven years.
We next call the court's attention to 104-2-7 to the
effect that the person establishing a legal title to the
property shall be presumed to have been possessed
thereof ·within the time required by law, and the accupation of the property by any other person shall be deemed
to have been under and in subordination to the legal title
unless it appears that the property has been held and
possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years
before the commencement of the action.

104-2-9 sho"\VS· what constitutes adverse possession
under a written instrument, and 104-2-12 reads as fol
lows:
''In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the
land has been occupied and claimed for the period of
seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which
have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.''
May we consider the evidence to show which party
has been in the open, notorious and adverse possession
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of the property lying South of the pipeline. In 1907
James G. Wood was granted this property by warranty
deed from the Traugotts. There was no dispute regarding this statement. Various conveyances were n1ade of
the property in question after 1907, and all conveyances
were 1nade subject to the James G. Wood deed. In 1932
the Clarks deeded -part .of the southwest quarter to the
Harrops but did not except the Wood land, and the deed
did not make any reference to the well, pipeline, water
rights or the land South of the well nor to the one-half
rod immediately north of the pipeline.
In the trial of the case the appellants at no ti1ne
denied the rights of the plaintiffs to the water rights,
the pipelines, the one-half rod right of way and the well.
The deed in question, therefore, from Clarks to the Harrops clearly and without question included rights possessed by the Woods and not denied by the defendants.
Mr. Clark is dead, but Mrs. Clark on the witness stand
testified that the Clarks did not claim any ownership
in the water system nor in the land South of the pipeline.
She testified on cross examination that they had cultivated at various times the land South of the pipeline
but that they always acknowledged that it was owned by
the Wood family.
The Harrops owned the property from 1932 until
they sold it to Mr. and Mrs. Ashby in 1947. The exact
description was used in the Harrop-Ashby deed that had
been used in the Clark-Harrop deed. Mr. Joyce Harrop
was subpoenaed by the appellants but was called by the
respondents and testified that the Harrops had the property surveyed shortly after they had purchased it in
1932, and that they found that the Woods had the water
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rights and the one-half rod right of way North of the
pipeline, and that the \\roods were the owners of the land
South of the pipeline and surrounding the well. He testified that during all of the tune from 1933 to 1947 the Harrop fanrily recognized and admitted that the Wood family
owned the said land and also had the water rights.
Then \Ve have Briant Ashby testifying that he knew
nothing about the \\rood claims until. he purchased the
property in 19± 7. He testified that he had no conversation with Joyce Harrop before he purchased it. And yet
on cross examination, after great hesitancy he finally adInitted that Joyce Harrop and he had walked over all of
the land in question and that Mr. Harrop had shown him
the property that he was purchasing. How could Joyce
Harrop and Briant Ashby walk over all of this ground
without Ashby seeing at least the well and without his
observing that at least the great majority of the orchard
which he was buying extended only to a distance north
of the pipeline~
On the extreme East of the property where Christensens' house is located, Mr. Christensen testified that he
removed three peach trees from in front and a trifle
to the West of his house. To us it appears that the testiInony of Joyce Harrop is amply supported. When he
testified that he and his fa1nily at all times between 1933
and 1947 recognized that the property belonged to the
Wood family, he was testifying against his own interest.
Counsel for the defense recognized this testimony against
interests when he asked permission to make the Clarks
and the Harrops parties defendants. If there were any
adverse possession, it did not commence until after the
Ashhys purchased the ground, and Briant Ashby testified
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that he only cultivated the ground South of the pipeline
for one year. That was in 1948. Considering the Utah
law regarding adverse possession, we can see how the
Ashbys failed in their defense on that ground. This evidence supports Respondents' title not only by legal title
but by undisputed possession since 1907 until 1948.
As to the error alleged in second paragraph of finding 1 on page 4, the finding was certainly supported by
the evidence. The appellants maintained that the fence
was built by them and their predecessors in interest. The
evidence, which was undisputed, showed that the first
fence was built by James G. Wood and his sons. (Tr.
152). His sons are now the respondents. That fence continued to stand there until during Harrops' ownership
of the land North of the pipeline. During the latter part
of their ownership they asked permission of the Wood
family to change the fence and move the same Southward
in order to overcome the danger to anin1al and human
life. (Alvin Wood Tr. 156 and 157). The distance between the ditch, which was known as Swift Creek, and
the existing fence was narrow, and it was recognized a~
a dangerous place. The fence was then moved under
permission of the Wood family, and it was placed approximately three feet onto the highway. The ditch
has since that time been piped. The testimony of predecessors in interest to Ashby, Joyce Harrop and Lottie
J. Clark show that they made no clailn to the property.
The question of the double payment of taxes was
settled by stipulation at the commencement of the trial.
The finding number 2 on page 4 is substantiated by
the testimony of the predecessors in interest to Ashh~·
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who testified that if they gre\Y crops it 'vas per1nissive
and that it \YHS often interrupted by the vV oods. Joyce
1-larrop, (rrr. 13S-139) Lottie J. Clark, (Tr. -±0). The
saHte testilnony goes to prove the further findings on
page 5 and 6 along \Yith the testin1ony of the Woods to
the effect that they had built the fence themselves. As
to the findings nun1ber 5 on page 7 respondent finds it
difficult to reconcile appellants state1nent that ''the evi!
dence sho,ved the plaintiffs (respondents) have an undisputed interest in the land in question.'' The respondents certainly haYe an interest but the same was being
disputed by the appellants to the extent that they were
putting further right of ways across the property and
were allowing pig pens to be moved from their land onto
the \Yoods property and the appellants removed the
fence which the respondents attempted to build to protect their property. The mere fact that this suit had
to be filled to protect against his claim indicates that
the appellants were assorting some claim to the property.
The findings number 1 on page 8 is supported by the
testimony of the predecessors in interest in which none
claimed any right or title to the property other than the
right of way across the property as provided by the deed.
As to the errors alleged in findings number 6 and 7
on page 10, we find from the testimony of the appellant
Christensen himself that he was informed of the rights
of the respondent by Loy and Melvin Wood when ''he
wa~ conte1nplating building"
(Tr. 103-104) also the
ownership of the Woods was a matter of public record.
As to elai1ning an open, notorious, adverse, hostile; uninterrupted, peaceable, continuous, exclusive, un-
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rnolested and undisputed possession of said property
the evidence shows that up until the tilne of the purchase
by Ashbys such were the existing conditions. At the
time of the purchase by Ashby the respondents informed
hin1 of their property right. They had an attorney write
the appellants informing them of the property rights,
as testified by Briant Ashby. (Tr. 126). When these
means were not sufficient to keep the appellants fron1
interfering with the property respondents con11nenced
building a fence which was ripped out by the defendants.
Respondents used every Ineans short of force to protect
their rights.
What further action need a land owner take to
inform someone of his rights to the land. The Woods
had every reason to believe that they could get along
with the adjoining land owners as they had done for
many, many years. When they found that the above
means were insufficient to protect their rights, a suit
was filed.

POINT IV
The evidence supporting the conclusions of law have
been discussed elsewhere in this brief. It can only be
reiterated that the right of way as established by the
court was the right of way which had been used since- the
original conveyance by Traugott to Wood. It has been
established that there cannot be a new and different
right of way created for each new piece of property.
The error claimed in conclusion two on page 11
avers that there has been an improper construction of
the deed. This also was discussed elsewhere and it can
only be repeated that the deed could in no way be con-
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strued to be a right to travel unrestrained in any direction over the \\roods property. If this had been the intent
the oods \vould have been given merely an easement
a right to the water but would not have been given
a warranty deed with a right of way to one-half rod
on the North. .A.s to the pollution it would be impossible to designate all iten1s \vhich may pollute the water.
Until the advent of the Ashbys, reasonable use o£ the
property North of the pipeline was made by Ashby's ·predecessors in interest and there was no quarrel. The
respondents were reasonable in their requests and the
ovvners of the property adjacent were reasonable in their
acquiscence. Upon the advent of the Ashbys, however,
they i1mnediately began to misuse and abuse the Wood
property as well as the property adjacent in such a way
that it 1nay pollute the water supply.

'T

POINT V
As to point V of appellants' brief there was evidence of pig droppings, pig pens and other items
brought adjacent to the well house and upon the land
belonging to Woods, with manure several inches deep.
This certainly was evidence of an item which could pollute the water.
POINT VI
As to point VI, the court does not treat the appellants as trespassing strangers completely. They treat
then1 as trespassers who have a right to utilize a right
of 'vay across the property, but who have gone further
than utilizing the right of way. They have allowed filth
to be moved upon the Wood property or upon their own
property so adjacent to the Woods vvell property as to
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pollute the waters and they are claiuilng innu1nerable
rights of way. There is no reason why the Woods cannot
build a fence along. the North side of their own property
leaving a road across for ingress and egress as required
by the court's findings and Decree. There was no evidence brought before the court of a deep trench on the
North of the strip. Such a trench however was constructed
since the suit to ward away excessive irrigation waters
used by defendants Ashby and Christensen. The trench
has been filled in by Christensens as soon as it is dug
however. As this trench is on the property owned by
the Woods and as long as this does not interfere vvith the
right of way given, it certainly is a proper use of their
own property. This is not a question of respondents acting as" dogs in the rnanger" as rnaintained by the appellants; rather, it is a question of the owners right to utilize
his own property without interference from trespassers
who desire to utilize his neighbor's property for road purposes in order that it will not be necessary to utilize his
own.
CONCLUSIONS
The testimony, the original deed, and the account~
of the parties establish the fact that the Wood family is
the owner in fee of the property lying South of the pipeline; and that they have a right of way over the one-half
rod of land immediately North of the pipeline; and that
they are entitled to continue the use of unconta1ninated
water for the eight residences it supplies. There is, of
course, the right of way (not rights of way) in the present
owners of the land to the North. The evidence has shown
that appellants had ample means of ingress and egress to
their property through highway 91 which abutted on the
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\Vest or over the regular right of 'vay on Woods propertyo
That they had infor1nation of the Woods ownership of
the property. rrhat they had in fact platted their property sho,ving the 1neans of ingress and egress to be ·from
hibo-h,yav"' 91 or fro1n the North. That in the face ot this
apparently they have sold their property abutting on
highway 91. That they have sold out other property
reserving approxil11ately three acres for themselves. That
they have 1neans of ingress and egress to this property
through the right of 'vay over the Wood property as
designated by the lo,ver court. That they now desire to
1nake a 1nockery of the \\'"?" ood ownership of their property
by having unlin1ited right of travel back and forth over
this property. The fact that the Woods have desired to
keep this property free of anything other than the one
right of way Inakes good sense in their utilization of the
property. Proper Inaintenance of the pipe and of the
water system may require deep excavations all through
Woods property. Driveways, right of ways, roads, excessive watering of lawns all would tend to make the utilization by Woods of the property difficult. Excessive watering of tomatoes by Mr. Clark who had been permitted to
plant tomatoes on the property, caused sufficient troubles
that ''Brother Clark was forbidden to plant any more
tomatoes thereon.
The history of Utah is, as in all the arid Western territory, a history of the development of the water supply
and the developn1ent of the state has been in direct ratio
to the water supply made available. Land in the West
ean only be utilized when there is "\Vater to supply it. The
1Iayor of Clearfield ( Tr. 85) testified that they could not
supply culinary water for the one hundred sixty acres of
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ground to which this spring water runs. To let this water
became polluted and unaccessible is not in keeping with
the culinary water requirements of this territory. To
allow many rights of way to develop fron1 one right of
way is inconsistent with the fee simple ownership of the
respondents to the strip of la~d in question.
We submit that the judgment and decree of the lo,ver
court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
RALPH J. LOWE
Attorney .for Respondents
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